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AFRICA 2000: "Africa and the World Economy : Prospects for Real Economic Growth" 
by A.nn Seidma n 
Crystal ball gazing is hardly the province of social scientists. The 
best one can do, in attempting to assess the prospects for real economic growth 
by the year. 2000, is to examine the contradicltery trends and struggles shaping 
the nolitical economy of Africa. and the world today , and suggest possible al-
ternative outcomes. Even the probabilities a.re obscure. 
What is clear is that, despite over ten yea.rs of indel)endence for over 
40 African countries, the majority~ of the peoples of Africa still confront 
the overrir'iing problem of poverty. Living on a continent endowed with ex-
tensive valuable mineral agricultural resources, they still suffer from among 
the lowest per capita. incomes and the highest martality rates in the world. 
SociaJ ; scientists can most effectively utilize their tools of analysis 
to expose the ca.uses of this problem. !•lhether and how it is ultimately 
solved will depend on the outcome of the contradictory trends, especially the 
stru/2"g1es of the continental and international class forces. This brief paper 
aims to outline the author ' s ·· views as to the nature of the causes of -p over ty 
in Africa, a.nn the relative strength of the contending forces and classes 
stru1te::lin,g to overcome it . 
I 
I have argued elsewhere at lengt Wthat the underlying explanation for the 
nersistence of poverty in Af rica, despite the attainment of political indepen-
dence in nost of the continent , lies in the political- economic institutions i n-
herited from almost a century of outright colonial rule. · The transnational 
~-
corporate interests controlling· the ' commanding heights ' , continue1· to dominate 
and sha.})e the export enclave'0 of the typ i cal Af.'rican economy, leaving it externally 
*Exoort -import trade, banks and financial institutions, and ·whatever basic industry 
exists. 
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deuendent on the capitalist world commercial system; and draining out, in 
the form of profits, interest, dividends, high, - aa.laries , and terrns-of-trane 
differences, most of the investable suil'.'Dluses producea by low-paid African 
workers and ~easa.nts . 
Since the attainment of poll ti cal independence in most African countries_, 
a newJ.y emergent 
alternatively, ' 
class ~- s ometimes called the ' bureaucratic bourgeoisie' or, 
the managerial bourgeoisie~- has utilized the existing or 
somewhat mor:lified s tate machinery to enrich its members. Typically, this class 
has been forced to rely on transnational corporate interests and t hei r home 
governments for financial, technologica.l, and, in some cases, even military 
assistance. Accepting the conventional ' western · wisdom that forei gn capital is 
essential for develoument , African governments have vied with eachother to 
- - ~ 
create the most 'hospitable investment climate ',. - -- In1 1 tb~i ~nd'-, tht'ly; ·' , have 
ban-rai ned away most if not all the potential national benefits proposed 
investments might have achieved in exchange for prestige, high salaries, 
nersonal fringe benefits, or, in some cases, outright bribes for the ruling 
elites. The primary benficiaries of this kind of ' growth without development' 
have been the transnational corporations who have secured for themselves 
contin\jin,g; supplies of valuable agricultural and mineral raw materials; markets 
for their surpluses of machinery and eQuipment, as well a s manufactured parts 
anr:l. materials; and a flow of profits. 
The wi nn er of this inviclious competition has not _ · ··: 
v 
been a ny of the 
newly indenendent .count r ies of Africa. Statistical data reveals tha.t by far 
the largest transnational corp~:ate investments i n Africa over the last 15 years 
'·.··, 
have been made in South Africa . There the white minori!Y has successfully 
-evcll'ii:~d- P state capitalism based on a handful of oligopoli stic mining finance 
houses and the direct use of explicitly discriminatory laws to coerce the African 
ma j ority into the status of an impoverished working class, denied any vestige 
of constitutional rights . In this context , transna.tiona.l corporations have 
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multiplied their investments, contributing to the creation of the most a.d-
va.nced, vertically integrated manufacturing sector on the continent. U.S . 
transnational ma.nufacturin~ corporations, for example, have invested four 
out of five dollars they have invested in all of ' Africa1 in · the ·· factories 
bf South Africa . 
The South African economy illustrates ih·'major respects ·the potential 
outcome of the ' distbrted pattern of development likely to · result from com...: 
·o-eti ti ve efforts to attract transnational corporate investment -- if, indeed, 
any development takes place a.t all. S'"'uth African racism has urovided a. 
particular form of ideological legi timazation .' "·. - ' "' · for a small g:r;oup of 
' haves' (the white mine, cfarm and factory owners together with a limited 
white labor a.risto~racy) to exercise their control of state power to raise 
their own incomes and living standards , while condemning the majority of the 
· working class and peasants (all black) to gross . impover±shment~What more 
efficient way of maintaining a low-cost labor fo r ce and avoiding urban unemploy-
ment and tensions than by restricting 80% of the population to 13% of the land 
area (so-called ' Bantustans ' ) from which adults may leave only to OQtain j obs from 
t he minority which has a monopoly over t he nation's productive sectors'? Let 
the rural ' bomelands ' pay for the 'care ' of the young , the unemployed, the. 
women, the old. If malnutrition , disease and death reduce their number, that 
is not the concern of the affluent minority, or the transnational corporations 
which have financed 'and provided the technolog~ for the phenomenal growth of their 
industries. 
There are those who insist that .justice · and equipy require no more than to 
eliminate t he racist features of South Africa, leaving its basic economi c structure, 
with its (illusory) free market for ces, in tact, a.nd the benefits of Sout h African 
development will accrue to all its inhabitant~In other ' words, a few lucky 
"Blacks will be included among the wealthy 'haves .' This is the pattern of 
' moderate ' change which United Nations Ambassador Andrew Young and Robert Oppen-
~ heimer have joined together to urge , in opposition to the fundamental political 
\ ·._ 
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economic reconstruction proposed by the armed liberation movements in southern 
Africa . 
]\lore than a decade of exnerierice in the politically independent countries 
of Africa has shown that any so-called ' development strategy ' based ' on attempts to 
attract furthe r transnational corporate investment in the context of already l op-
sir1ed, externally dependent economies, perpetuates the conditions which have 
condemned the vast majority of Africans to continuing poverty. r1a1nutri ti on, 
even outright starvati on, stalks the continent, as more and more of the best 
agricultural land, irrigation , fertilzers, marketing facilities, and extension 
agencies are devoted to expanding exports to : '- -~· uncertain fluctuating i.iorlo 
( 
markets domi nated by transnational trading and processing companies~Unemployment 
JTl.ounts in unsanitary, overcrowecled urban· s !l.0uatter compounds as young men and 
women flee spreading rural underdevelo"J)ment . Their hopes for jobs are dashed 
as whatever limited funds available a.re invested in capital- intensive, last-
sta.f?.:e processing and assembly plants to produce luxury and semi- luxury items 
. q 
from imported parts and materials for the l uIKky few with cash to buy them'Y 
As world prices for national mineral or agricultural ex:ports fall, government 
a.fter government has had to borrow f:rom transnational banks and international . 
agencies to cover growing expenditures. Domestic inflationary forces have been 
fed by rising •1orld prices of the i mported goods and materials on which the 
economy has become increasingly dependent. Overseas borrowing has still further 
aggravated .ea.tional external dependency , adding growing payments of interest as 
~ . 
well as principal to future balance of -payments burdensW 
In the last three years , the weaknesses of this pattern of development have 
been sharpl y exposed as the world capi talist system has once a.gain plunged into 
a general crisis . It is now evia.ent that the monetary crisis of the late ' sixties 
was only the beginning of a more encompassing set of economic difficulties enmesl3ing 
• l 
the uoli ti cal economi es of the entire developed ca pi tali st iwrld. In the under-
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developed countries of Afri ca, as well as throughout the rest of the Third 
World , fluctuating exchange rates, rising costs and growing inflation have 
wreaked havoc as unemployment and declining growth rates have renuced markets 
in Euro-pe a nd the United States. Rendered increasingly de1Jendent on imports 
and expanding sales abroad, country after country has been confronted by 
sky- rocketing inflation and mounting unemployment, accompanied by expanding 
internal and external debt , j ust fo finance current expenditures. 
Even South Africa has become deeply immersed in an economic, as well as· 
a uolitical crisis. It has .been estimated that unemployment among Africans 
has reached 15 to 20% of the labor force . Inflation is well into the two-digit 
numbers , slashing real incomes of those sho $till have jobs . Rising military 
costs, required to suppress growing opposition, has led to cuts '1.n other govern-
ient expenditur es and contributed to hea vy ba.lance of payments deficits. Although 
transnational banks have multiplied t heir loans to South Africa to over $9 b'illion, 
(probably closer to $12 billion, exceeding total investments of transnational 
·\'\ 
corporations there)'Y"south Afri ca ; s domestic economy shows few signs of returning 
to the high rates of growth of the 1960s. Even two devaluations, 'designed in 
South Af r ica as elsewhere to thr cw t _he burden of ' readjustment ' on the Afri can 
wage earners, have not restorerl prosperity:, . 
There is no easy answer to the question posed at the outset of this pa:per : 
" What does all this mean for Africa in the year 2000?" I t is clear that, unless 
somethin~ ha1Jpens to alter t he under lying factors causing the problems inherent 
in the gloomy 1Jicture pai nted above, the masses of the population of Afri ca. --
'W by 2000 there will probably be almost 800 million inhabitants .:.-wi ll, if any- : '? 
thing, be more impoverished than today . This will remain true even i f whlie ·- · · 
minority :;:.ule -: i s ·elill!;inated in southern Af r ica , as long as the basic di storted 
political economic struc.ture remains in tact . 
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II 
But there are trends and movements on the cont~imt that may lead to a more 
effective pattern of real economic growth. Tanzania's TANU, having taken over 
v 
the commanding heights of the economy in 1967, has for more than a decade been 
involved in a 'silent class struggle' to build a transition to President Nyerere's 
~ 
brand of ujamaa social ownership of the means of product ion . Algeria is investing 
the vast (though temporary) surpluses accumulated from the sale of its oil at 
OPEC prices, in building what its leaders prclaim as a socialist economy with 
. . . \f . 
a relatively capital-intensive technological base~ozambique, Guinea. Bissau, 
and Angola, having won independence after a decade of gueralla warfare, have 
rled~ -,_·ed a.s their aim the restructuring of their economies along t'Pia..>rxist'-L~lnist li~ 
;I'he presence of socialist-orin~ted governments ln a third of the world , 
despite their serious ideological differences and conflicts (one can only deplore 
the. unfortunate results of the carryover of these conflicts into Africa.:), · 
offers African countries embarking on the path of restructuring their ecomomies 
real alternatives to transnational corporations for technological and financial 
assistance . This was illustrated by China ' s financing of the Tazara railroad 
after Western governments refused to assist. It was exemplified, too , when 
. Cuban and Soviet aid enabled the new government of Angola to push back the 1975 
South African invasion, anc then ·provided -esserltial technical personnel to 
train Angolans · to replace the Portuguese who had , left precini tousl~r. But in the 
last analysis , the African countries :111.ust work out and implement their own 
-plans and strategies·' to:'.-.attain"·Self-reliant • development, 
The transition period , in all these countries ~ ·will inevitably be f:rQ..ught 
.with contradictions and setbacks ; even if the declared goals are ul tima.tely 
attained . It is easy for armchair theorists (and social scientists are~ , ad-
mittedly, almost all found in that· category) to voice their opinions of these 
contradi~tory phenomena, but it is difficult to determine the probable outcomes 
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•·iith any c·ertainty . Some critics, f or example, argue that enforceli ujamaa- ization 
has rendered Tanzania's political l eadership incapable of maintaining mass sup-
port ., and has strengthened class elements seeking to block furthe r socialist 
r econst:r:uction of the economy. Others insist that the r esulting fundamental 
changes in rural institutions and attitudes may , over time, lea.dto increasingly 
·successful socialization of agricultural productive activity. 
Tn L.P" :i;-ia, .the creation of la;rn:e- cale, capital-in ensive ind~stries, 
some commentators maintain, has facilitated the emergence of a group of 
technical experts :who control critical decision-making, blocking the growth 
of effectiye participation by less skilled workers and traditional peasants . 
Others hold that the leadership is working· to create new participatory institl:i-
t ions and, over time, the contradictions inherent i n the industrial program will 
be resolved as workers acquire more skills and take an increasingly active role 
in managing the growing socialized sector. 
~ozambique, Angola, and Guinea Bissau have only just taken the initial 
steps in restructuring their' political economies in the last two years, Guinea 
Bissau faces serious constraints because ,of the tiny size of its . land area and 
population, though initially in some ways this may facilitate attainment of the 
na ct ional unity nei&:essary to imulemerit ~ts program and attain real economic growth. 
\/ . 
N!ozambique and Angola, on the other hand, not only confront the . difficult problems 
i'ly . 
of reconstruction, but also .border en and are necessar/ continuously involved in 
the on- going struggles for liberation in the rest of southern Africa. The white 
minority regimes, allied with transaational corporate interests ~hich · are sometimes 
backed by their home governments, have engineered and will undoubtedly continue to 
employ a range of techniques to destabilize and if possible topple these new 
governments. Occasionally , these concealed maneuvers have emerged:·ihj;.o the open, 
as ween the Rhodesian military attack ... villages de€p inside Mozambique, and South 
African troops openly aid UNITA's efforts to disrupt reconstruction in southern 
An~ola . 
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Given the inevitablility of a "two- steps-forwa;r-d , one-st,e-J?-back" 
kind of progress , these nations -- if they sue:ceed in fl11:l!TS:U:ilng t:fue:i:r d'e:-:- ··t '. · 
e·!bared ~ goals -- may by the end of the century have i mplemented a series of carefully 
designed. physical a.nd fina.~cial·plans in t he context of long term development 
stra.t ei;ries to provi de increasingly productive employment opportuntie s and r i sing 
living standards for the masses of their inhabitants in the context of increasingly 
integrated , balanced, and self-reliant economies. An essential prerequisite to 
. building 
their success is that the leading political party s'act~eeGl~s bft!tre/ (>' " the unity and 
increasing participation of the working people and peasantry i n the control of 
the nation ' s productive facilities and the planning proci;;sses . 
Effective regional integration, involving a high degree of political 
econo~ic coordination, including joint state ownershi p of the commanding heights 
of the partici pating economies , could greatly speed this process of ~econstruction 
• 
and attainment of real economic growth .~This kind of regional integration should 
be disii · .-·~nguished, however , from the unplanned common market type , which permits 
..._.. 
transnational corporate investments to foster uneven development at the expense -
of the majori t y of the peoples of the regi ons, as.occurred in those · established 
in Southern Africa , the Federation of Rhodesias a nd Nyasa.land, a.nd East Africa ; 
and probably - ~ill ~·occur:·in West Africa as the • comm6n <· marJrnt ·~there1 i s ·presently 
constitute~ Tanzania and Mozambique, for example , have agreed to attempt 
to formulate and i mplement complementary industrial strategies. If this initiative 
i s seriously pursued , and accompanied by the necessary inst i tutional changes, the 
merger of their markets and available i nvestment funds could enable them , over time, 
to t ake advantage of signif i cant economies of scale in basic industries like i ron 
and steel . centred on Tanzania ' s known iron and coal deposits, located near the 
Taiaar a railway; and a hydro-electric grid radia.ting out from Mozambique's giant 
Cabora- Ba.ssa. Da.m, linked to the proposed St i gl er Gorge project. These potentials 
wouill.d be enormously enhanced by incorporation of Zambia, making it possible t o 
J. ink up also with Angol a , and a liberated Zi mbabwe . The f i ve countries, working 
together could i mplement .ioint development plans capable of revolutionizing the 
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the -product :b ve capa.ci ty and living standards . throughout the region. _ 
The total liberati on of the white- mi nc:P-_·ty ruled nations of Namibia, 
Zimbabwe anri South Africa would clearly q_ualitatively alt er· the possibilities 
f or restructuring the regional southern Africari polj:t:J:cal economy . The three 
countries, between them, have e))tensive mineral and agricultural resources. 
More important , South .A frica and Zi mbabwe, together,- as a result of historical 
i nve stment s enabling them to a t t ain the status of dominant regional i mperialist 
subcenters -- have the largest industrial sector in Africa. -_- Planned i ntegration 
of thei r product i ve capacity and investa.ble surpluses into regional s t:rat:egi _es 
could-·greatly acck1erat8' ·ihdust t ial and agricultural .growth throughout the 
entire region. 
With full- s cale guerilla war f a re i n Zimbab1~e and Namibia, and extensive 
urban up-ri sings in South Africa, the liberation of the se countr ies may occur 
~uch sooner than social scientists . would hav~ predicted five years ago. The 
real question now is whether or not a fundamental reconstruction of these 
countries' politcial economies will take -place when the white minoritj: regimes 
are at last ousted . The biggest danger is that transnat ional corporate interests, 
sup-ported by their home governments, will manipulate negotiations and intervene 
politically and even militarily to_ :perpetuate the underlying exploitative !3tructure 
behind a facade of rule by pne or another type of black elite~ 
I II 
I n sum, tne proppects for real economic growth in Africa by the year 
2000 will be determined by t he outcome of contradictory forces and class struggles. 
If the emergent 'bureaucratic bourgeoi sies ' , heavily reliant on transnsnational 
corp9_;1;a.t~ involvement, perpetuate the inherited pattern of lop- s i ded, externally 
dependent growth, it seems probable that t he masse s of the African people will 
remain impover~ shed and increa:singly oppressed. 
If , on th_e other hand, the wage -earners, anemployed, and peasantry, together 
with committed i ntellectuals, uni te to control the mat?hinery of state and the 
commanding heights of their national economies, they may be able to i mplement 
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plans for political economic reconstruction to :provide: product ive employment 
opportunities and rising living standards for all. Invevitably, even for 
countries already embarked on this route' there will be difficul tie.s and set -
backs. Their prospects would be enhanced if they could integrate their · 
ec orn:::t ' mies on a ·regional and, ultimately, continental basis, but t his, too , 
l/ 
depends on their political unity and strength . 
The full liberation and restructuring of the southern African nations, 
particularly if their relatively industrialized economies were uni ted with 
those of neighboring countries in the context of a longterm planned regional 
development strategy, could go a l ong way in contri buting to real economic 
growth to meet the needs of the peo-ple throughout the region and even the 
entire continent. Given the extensive involvement of the U. S. and other 
transnational corporate interests in maintaining the political economic 
status quo in southern Africa, it remains to be seen whether the liberation 
forces, : t~g~bhar witb ~their a llies on the continent as well as els~where, 
can xealize .these potent ials . · 
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